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Abstract 
This thesis is one of the first studies to investigate empirically the relation between globalization and 
political trust. Two different mechanisms are identified that explain how globalization might have an 
impact on political trust. The first is based on the assumption that globalization has a constraining 
effect on a government’s set of feasible policy options, and holds that this makes a government less 
responsive to voter preferences, thereby leading to a decrease in political trust. The second assumes 
that globalization does not have the same impact on all segments of society, and predicts that citi-
zens’ attitudes towards globalization are positively related with political trust. In addition, it expects 
this relation to be more pronounced in countries that are more globalized. Hypotheses derived from 
these two mechanisms are tested by multi-level analysis on data from the European Social Survey 
(ESS) conducted between 2002 and 2012. The results provide mixed support for the first mecha-
nism. Political globalization is found to have a negative effect on political trust, but – contrary to 
expectations – no effect is found for economic globalization. However, the results do provide sub-
stantial support for the second mechanism. This supports the argument that there is a gap between 
the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization in terms of trust, and that this gap increases as globaliza-
tion increases. Although further work needs to be done to confirm these results and to refine the 
causal mechanisms, the results do reveal that the relation between globalization and political trust is 
a topic worthy of further investigation. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalization has been argued to challenge modern democracies in several ways. In the literature on 
the effects of globalization on domestic politics, one strand of research has focused on the conse-
quences of globalization for policy-making by national governments. The conclusion of this research 
has often been that processes of globalization increasingly constrain national governments in their 
capacity to independently shape policy outcomes (e.g. Cerny, 1999; Mishra, 1998; Rudra, 2002). 
Globalization has therefore been linked with the decrease of state power and depoliticization in this 
literature. A second strand of research has studied the way globalization has affected the political 
attitudes and behavior of individuals. Scholars in this field of study have argued that globalization is 
becoming a new ‘critical juncture’ especially in European countries, leading to the restructuring of 
the political preferences of the electorate and a realignment of parties (e.g. Bornschier, 2010; Kriesi, 
2010; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008).  
Assuming then that processes of globalization have indeed affected state capacities on the 
one hand and have restructured political preferences of citizens on the other, it is plausible to expect 
that globalization affects the relation between the government and the governed as well. However, the 
empirical understanding of globalization’s effect on this relation is still limited. Some research has 
started to address this question by studying globalization in relation to topics such as electoral ac-
countability (e.g. Fernandez-Albertos, 2006; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007), voter turnout (Steiner, 
2010) and partisanship (Golden, 2004; Kayser, 2009). In general however the literature on this topic 
is not yet fully developed, leaving many questions still open (Kayser, 2007 provides an overview).  
This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by looking at the relation between globaliza-
tion and political trust. Political trust is one specific form of the relationship between governments 
and the governed that has hardly received academic attention in relation to globalization. Some 
scholars have speculated on such a relation, for example proposing that the decline of public trust in 
government of the last decade “may be the inevitable result of the declining role of government in 
the age of globalization” (Hardin, 2013: 32). Other research provides evidence for the effect of glob-
alization on concepts related to political trust, giving an indication of the effect globalization might 
have on political trust. An example is Steiner’s (2010) finding that economic globalization has a neg-
ative effect on voter turnout. To my knowledge, only one study has addressed the relation between 
globalization and political trust directly. This study (which, to date, has not been formally published) 
does find that economic globalization has a trust-lowering effect (Fischer, 2012).  
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This thesis therefore explores further the relation between globalization and political trust. 
Integrating the insights of the two abovementioned strands of research, it investigates whether and 
how a country’s level of globalization is related to individual-level attitudes of political trust. Two 
different mechanisms are distinguished that explain how globalization might have an impact on po-
litical trust: one that hypothesizes an effect of globalization on the trust of citizens in general, and 
one that looks at how it affects different segments of society in a different way. The first is based on 
the assumption that globalization has a constraining effect on a government’s set of feasible policy 
options, and holds that this makes a government less responsive to voter preferences. This is hy-
pothesized to lead to a general decrease in political trust. The second mechanism emphasizes that 
globalization does not have the same impact on all segments of society. Assuming that attitudes to-
wards globalization differ according to citizens’ gains and losses from globalization, as well as their 
value-orientation, it predicts that especially those who oppose globalization develop negative atti-
tudes towards political institutions. In addition, this relation is expected to be more pronounced in 
countries that are more globalized. Both mechanisms are tested using a multilevel analysis of data 
from the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted between 2002 and 2012 in 29 countries.  
Besides the filling of an academic void, the results of this study are highly relevant in social 
and political terms as well. In the first place it adds to the discussion on the societal effects of global-
ization. The value of this hardly seems to need explanation in a time when headlines are filled with 
news about issues such as immigrants waging their lives to enter Europe and protest against free 
trade agreement TTIP. Secondly, it gives more insight in the debate over the new social divisions 
that have been argued to be arising within national societies. If globalization does indeed create 
groups of winners and losers, and the gap between these groups in terms of trust increases as global-
ization increases, it would make the question how governments of globalized countries can compen-
sate for this divide more urgent.  
 
2. Theory 
2.1. Globalization 
Globalization is usually understood as the increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, 
people, information, and culture (Held et al. 1999: 16), although not all scholars agree whether it is 
an effect or a cause of such exchanges (e.g. Guillèn, 2001). It is a process that erodes national 
boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance, and produces 
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complex relations of mutual interdependence (Norris, 2000: 155). Issues associated with it are as 
diverse as a country’s integration in the world market, its membership to international organizations 
and increasing cultural diversity as a consequence of immigration and new communication technol-
ogies. It is therefore a concept that is difficult to demarcate. In order to get a more precise under-
standing of it, it is useful to define it as consisting of different dimensions. Usually, three such di-
mensions are distinguished: economic, political and cultural (or social) globalization (e.g. Dreher, 
2006; Keohane and Nye, 2000a). Other dimensions such as environmental globalization or military 
globalization are sometimes distinguished as well, but are less relevant for the purpose of this thesis.  
Economic globalization can be characterized as “long distance flows of goods, capital and 
services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges” (Keohane and 
Nye, 2000b: 106). From the perspective of national governments economic globalization can be 
conceived of as integration in the world market, which is the consequence of free trade agreements 
and the removal of others kinds of trade-barriers. In the literature on economic globalization, a cen-
tral question has been how it affects the extent to which governments can still independently exert 
control over their domestic socioeconomic policies. Some autors have argued that global market 
integration subverts the welfare state by limiting the possibilities governments have for welfare 
compensation (Burgoon, 2001; Mishra, 1999; Rudra, 2002). Others have assessed how economic 
globalization is related to all sorts of other domestic policies, such as education policies (Baskaran 
and Hessami, 2012), military expenditures (Bove and Efthyvoulou, 2013) and overall government 
spending (Dreher et al, 2008b; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001).Although this debate still is not settled, 
the conclusion has often been that globalization does limit the policy options governments have, 
and drives domestic policies in a certain direction.  
Political globalization secondly can be expressed as the diffusion of government policies 
(Dreher et al., 2006). One could argue that all forms of globalization have political implications, so 
that it might seem strange to speak of political globalization as a separate dimension. However, this 
thesis conceives of political globalization as a more specific dimension of globalization, namely as a 
country’s integration in the political community. In the words of Cerny (1997) it “involves the re-
shaping of political practices and institutional structures in order to adjust and adapt to the growing 
deficiencies of nation-states as perceived and experienced by such actors” (p. 243, italics in original). In 
other words, governments deliberately choose for elements of political globalization in order to 
achieve communal goals that they do not feel able to achieve individually. On a more concrete level, 
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political globalization refers to issues such as membership of international organizations, interna-
tional treaty ratification and international peace missions. 
Cultural globalization finally involves the “movement of ideas, information, images and peo-
ple” (Keohane and Nye, 2000b: 107). Whereas economic and political globalization mostly take 
place at the level of institutional politics and political elites, cultural globalization is more about pro-
cesses at the individual level, such as citizens becoming interconnected with foreign cultures. In poli-
tics, cultural globalization is often equated with immigration and increasing cultural diversity. Alt-
hough immigration certainly is the politically most salient element of cultural globalization, it is only 
one of its elements (examples of other elements are the usage of  new communication technologies 
and increasing tourism). Together, these elements have been reported to have a profound impact on 
intergroup relations. Some scholars have for example found that globalization increases identifica-
tion with the nation and xenophobia (e.g. Jung, 2008), whereas others have reached an opposite 
conclusion (Arielly, 2011 and 2012; Norris and Inglehart, 2009). Yet, it is likely that not all segments 
of society experience the impact of cultural globalization in a similar way. Indeed, it has been argued 
that the gap between these experiences is so significant that it is plausible to speak of groups that 
‘win’ and groups that ‘lose’ of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008 and Kriesi, 2010, 2014). Ac-
cording to this line of research, globalization has thus created new social divisions, which have been 
framed as ‘the new cultural cleavage’ (e.g. Bornschier, 2010; Van Praag and Adriaansen, 2011).  
Altogether, globalization has contradictory consequences for several aspects of domestic 
politics. This thesis assumes that two of these consequences are important with regard to political 
trust. Firstly the way in which it affects domestic policy-making by national governments, more spe-
cifically the way it constrains these governments to shape policy outcomes. And secondly the way in 
which it restructures citizens’ political preferences. For each of these two consequences, a mecha-
nism is proposed by which it might affect political trust. In the logic of the first mechanism it is es-
pecially economic globalization that is important, whereas cultural globalization is more important 
for the line of reasoning of the second mechanism.  
 
2.2. Political Trust 
In order to relate these two mechanisms to political trust, this thesis first provide a framework to 
understanding political trust in relation to globalization. Following Newton and Norris (2000), at 
least three schools of thought can be discerned in explaining political trust: a social-psychological 
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explanation, a social and cultural explanation and an institutional performance model. The social-
psychological explanation understands trust as a property of someone’s own personality: as a result 
of someone’s psychological development, someone is either trusting or not. The social and cultural 
model secondly holds that someone’s individual life experiences and environment lead to social trust 
and cooperation, which in turn leads to trust in public institutions. According to this model, political 
trust is a function of a broad democratic culture with participating citizens. The institutional perfor-
mance model lastly argues the actual performance of governments should be central in attempts to 
understand citizens’ confidence in politics. This model assumes that the general public “recognizes 
whether government or political institutions are performing well or poorly, and reacts accordingly” 
(Newton and Norris, 2000: 56).  
 This study does not aim to identify one explanation of political trust as the best explanation. 
Rather, it is to develop a perspective on political trust that shows how the different dimensions of 
globalization might affect political trust. Such a perspective must at least account for factors other 
than individuals’ personal characteristics, as globalization is not likely to have an impact on these. It 
must also be able to account for changes in trust over time, since a changing degree of globalization 
should lead to a change in trust. With these considerations in mind, the social-psychological explana-
tion not very useful. Because this explanation is more focused on personality traits, it has less atten-
tion for peoples’ broader social context.  
 The social and cultural model would explain changes in political trust as consequences of 
changes in individuals’ social environment. This model might therefore be able to explain a relation 
between globalization and political trust, since globalization (especially cultural globalization) surely 
has the potential to affect the social environment of citizens. It is not very controversial to claim that 
processes such as immigration and the emergence of a ‘global village’ have changed the way people 
live together. Some even have gone as far as to claim that these processes have challenged social 
solidarity and decreased the social capital of societies, which has led to a decrease in trust in other 
people (e.g. Bobo and Tuan, 2006; Putnam, 2007). Assuming that social trust spills over to political 
trust, it is clear how globalization might affect political trust according to this model. It should how-
ever be noted that the empirical evidence supporting such a spillover-effect is mixed (e.g. Hardin, 
2013).  
 The institutional performance model too provides a useful perspective on political trust. 
Firstly, because it is supported by most empirical studies that have tried to explain the changes in 
trust of the last two decades. Newton and Norris’s own research for example provides substantial 
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evidence for this model (and not for the other two), and so did many later studies (e.g. Letki, 2006; 
Newton and Zmerli, 2011; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). More importantly, the institutional model fits 
to the consequences of globalization this thesis focuses on, because these consequences mostly re-
late to governmental performance or citizens’ perception of this performance. Following the institu-
tional model of political trust, confidence in political institutions can be seen as based on a reciprocal 
relation between citizens and their government: citizens perform their civic duties (such as paying 
tax, respecting the rule of law and voting), and expect ‘good institutional performance’ by the gov-
ernment in return. This performance may consist of achieving economic growth, ensuring employ-
ment and guaranteeing public safety. On a more abstract level these expectations can be categorized 
under dimensions such as competence, accountability, intrinsic care and reliability (e.g. Van der 
Meer, 2010). Political trust increases when these expectations are met, and will decrease if they are 
not met. This leads to an understanding of political trust as the gap between the electorate’s political 
preferences and the actual policies executed by its government. The wider this gap, the lower politi-
cal trust is.  
 
2.3. Constrained domestic policy-making 
From this perspective on political trust, globalization can affect political trust by altering either the 
expectations of citizens or the institutional performance of governments. In the first mechanism 
distinguished in this thesis it mainly is globalization’s supposed effect on this institutional perfor-
mance that is important. In short, this mechanism presumes that globalization ties governments’ 
hands by restricting the policy choices they have. This makes these governments less responsive to 
the needs and preferences of citizens, which in turn leads to a decrease in political trust.  
The argument that globalization affects national governments’ ability to shape policies and 
control their outcomes is one of the central theses of the globalization literature. As discussed earli-
er, it is especially the economic dimension of globalization that is important here. Economic globali-
zation is expected to have several direct effects on socioeconomic policy options. Following Schulze 
and Ursprung (1999) at least four such effects can be distinguished (see also Steiner, 2010). Firstly, 
fiscal instruments become more and more ineffective as tools for controlling the national economy. 
Secondly, the competition over mobile direct investments as factors of production becomes more 
important. Thirdly, the competition on global markets between national economies as production 
sites increases in relevance. And lastly, the competition over sources of tax revenue between coun-
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tries becomes more and more important. While these expectations themselves are rather commonly 
accepted, it is important to note that these effects do not imply actual policy outcomes. The out-
come depends on national policy makers’ concrete reaction to these effects.   
Turning to the effect of globalization on actual policy outcomes, the academic debate is still 
split between two camps. At the one side of this debate are proponents of the efficiency hypothesis, 
and on the other side those who support the compensation hypothesis (see Meinhard and Potrafke, 
2012 for a recent overview of this debate). The efficiency hypothesis firstly takes the intensified 
competition between countries as starting point and argues that globalization forces countries to stay 
competitive, and thus to be efficient. It predicts a ‘race to the bottom’ in tax- and welfare policies, 
and expects that globalization reduces the size of the government and its ability to bear the costs of 
the welfare state. Research under this hypothesis has found that governments are pressured to for 
example liberalize the labor market as national firms need to stay competitive (Dreher and Gaston, 
2007), to lower taxes in order to attract and retain business, and even to cut public expenditure in 
general (e.g. Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Busemeyer, 2009; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Genschel, 
2002).  
The compensation hypothesis (or embedded liberalism hypothesis) has more attention for 
the demand side of politics. It is based on Katzenstein’s (1985) observation that small European 
countries are relatively open to the world economy, but have large governments as well. Building on 
this observation, the hypothesis holds that economic globalization has led to economic uncertainty 
at the individual level, which has increased the political demand for protection against the risks of 
globalization. Depending on the extent to which incumbents have satisfied this demand, authors 
supporting this hypothesis have claimed that economic integration has actually led to an increase in 
the size of the welfare-state (Rodrik, 1998) or has at least not jeopardized the welfare-state (Plümper 
et al., 2009; Ursprung, 2008).  
The final outcome of the debate is not yet clear. At least it shows that there is no uniform 
reaction towards economic integration, since this reaction depends on social and economic contexts. 
In addition, the results of empirical research are dependent on the type of policy that is looked at 
(tax, social or industrial policies). Some scholars have therefore argued that the efficiency and com-
pensation effects actually neutralize each other. It might be the case that there is indeed a race to the 
bottom when it comes to tax rates, but that governments increase their social spending at the same 
time (Meinhard and Potrafke, 2012). Together, this might evidently lead to serious problems for 
governments. 
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Leaving the debate between the efficiency and compensation hypothesis aside, integration in 
the world market has been argued to affect the policy choices that governments face in other ways 
as well. One way is that integration in the world market comes with almost unavoidable structural 
changes for economic sectors. Following Ricardian logic, countries need to specialize in the sectors 
in which they have a comparative advantage to other countries, which makes some industries flour-
ish whereas others disappear. This might lead to sectoral unemployment (Gaston and Nelson, 2004), 
and to a rising overall income inequality (Dreher and Gaston, 2008; Egger and Kreickmeier, 2009). 
In addition, the general argument can be made that economic globalization makes countries more 
dependent on the world market, making them more sensitive to fluctuations in the world economy. 
‘Domino effects’ are more likely to occur when national economies become more intertwined 
(Hertz, 1999). 
Altogether, the current state of the research makes it plausible to speak about the constrain-
ing effect of economic globalization on domestic policy-making. The fact that policy makers’ reac-
tions are not uniform does not mean that domestic policies remain unaffected by the competitive 
pressures of integration in the world market. Although the most extreme variants of ‘race to the 
bottom’-accounts might have been too pessimistic, it is hard to find a scholar who claims that glob-
alization has had no effect on domestic policies at all. It is therefore safe to conclude that “while 
controversies remain over the exact extent to which economic integration has diminished the capaci-
ty of national policy makers to influence relevant outcomes, we can reasonably assume that econom-
ic globalization does constrain national politics to significant degree” (Steiner, 2010: 446).  
For this reason, globalization has also been linked with a decline of partisanship. Assuming 
that in the extreme, “governments may be compelled to carry out policies that are entirely ‘dictated’ 
by the forces of economic globalization” (Fischer, 2012: 19), the ideological profile of a government 
becomes less significant. No matter whether governments consists of left-wing or right-wing parties, 
they still may be pushed to liberalize the labor market, or to cut public spending. Indeed, research 
has found that party positions on a left-right scale become closer as a country is more integrated in 
the world economy (Steiner and Martin, 2012), and national governments’ room to maneuver has 
decreased (Cerny, 1999; Steiner, 2013). Although not all research supports this view (e.g. Garrett, 
1998; Potrafke, 2009), several scholars have argued that in this way, globalization has led to a severe 
restriction of partisan politics since “the environment has changed in such a way that traditional 
social democratic instruments are no longer effective” (Moses 1994: 133). According to these schol-
ars, political parties and governments in general have lost their capacity to develop their preferred 
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economic policies (e.g. Cerny, 1994; Strange, 1995). An especially telling example of this lack of na-
tional control over economic policies is the situation of EU member states, that have to deal with a 
single European market allowing people, goods, and services to move freely, and with a monetary 
policy which is beyond their direct control.  
 
2.3.1.  Linking constrained domestic policy-making with political trust 
Taking this constraining effect that globalization might have on domestic policy-making into ac-
count, it becomes clear that economic globalization makes it more difficult for governments to fulfill 
their ‘reciprocal responsibilities’. This in turn might lead to a widening of the gap between voters’ 
preferences and actual policies, giving citizens the feeling that their government is not responsive to 
their wishes. As a result, increasing globalization goes together with a decrease in political trust. This 
is an argument similar to that of Fischer (2012), who indeed found empirical evidence supporting 
the claim that a stronger integration in the world market leads to a decrease in political trust.  
 It may seem rather ambitious to link a broad and disputed concept such as globalization 
directly with political trust. It might be questioned whether voters even notice a decrease in the poli-
cy-making capacity of their governments, and if they perceive their governments as less responsive 
as a consequence. Unfortunately, there is not much empirical evidence that directly links countries’ 
integration in the world economy and the degree to which citizens perceive constrains in policy-
making capacities.  
One exception is a study by Duch and Stevenson (2010). Using two cross-national surveys, 
they show that citizens of countries with more open economies perceive economic growth of the 
national economy as dependent on growth in other countries, whereas citizens of countries that are 
less dependent on international trade do so to a much lesser degree. Secondly, they looked at wheth-
er citizens see issues such as the availability of good-paying jobs (and several comparable issues) as 
the result of ‘global connectedness’. The results show that citizens do indeed perceive such a con-
nection. More importantly, they show that the perceived importance of global connectedness for 
such issues is stronger in countries with a higher integration in the world market. Both findings 
make clear that citizens connect the openness of their national economy with their idea of whether it 
is their government or the international economy that is responsible for certain outcomes. This indi-
cates that citizens are capable of perceiving a decrease in the policy-making capacities of their gov-
ernment as a consequence of economic integration.  
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Besides research linking economic integration and perceived constrains directly, there is 
some research available that links both indirectly. It has been found that citizens’ voting behavior 
does respond to increasing integration in the world economy. Hellwig and Samuels (2007) for exam-
ple report that globalization in the form of greater exposure to the world economy has reduced elec-
toral accountability in democracies. They argue that politicians have tried to shift blame for poor 
economic performance to economic forces beyond their control. Electorates then have to a consid-
erable extent accepted this reasoning and believe that governments in open economies are less com-
petent to shape economic outcomes. They also account for this in their voting behavior, giving less 
attention to economic issues in their voting considerations. In short, this means that “by reducing 
perceived competency, globalization reduces voters’ propensity to connect economic performance 
and incumbent performance” (p. 297). Similarly, Fernandez-Albertos (2006) has found that in open 
economies, “voters will value less the information they receive on the state of the economy, and, as 
a consequence, electoral behavior will be less influenced by economic performance” (p. 28).  
 This again indicates that voters do indeed respond to the openness of their economy, and 
link it to the economic policy capacity of their government. Admittedly, the consequence this has for 
political trust is not a given. One might argue that voters simply know that their government is less 
powerful in a more open economy, therefore do not blame their government for decreased respon-
siveness, and as a consequence do not lose political trust. However, there are good reasons to say 
that it does matter. The abovementioned studies do show that voters perceive their governments as 
less capable to shape policy outcomes, and therefore as less capable to do what they expect them to 
do. From the perspective of the institutional performance model of trust it would therefore be ex-
pected that voters perceive a widening gap between their preferences and actual policies. Although 
electorates may account for this decreased responsiveness it in their voting behavior, there is no 
direct reason to expect that voters adjust their expectations of the policies executed as well. Voters 
simply perceive a government that is less capable to respond to their needs. 
 Research by Steiner (2010) points in the direction of the latter argument. Assuming that eco-
nomic globalization limits the capacity of states to shape outcomes, Steiner argues like Hellwig and 
Samuels that citizens are aware of such limitations. What is more, he argues that voters take these 
limitations into account when considering whether or not to vote in national elections, a claim that is 
supported by his study. “The result is a lower inclination to vote under conditions of high economic 
integration. Consequently, aggregate turnout is lower the more internationally integrated a national 
economy is” (2010: 445). In updates of this study, Steiner (2013) and Steiner and Martin (2012) find 
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empirical support for the claim that it is indeed citizens’ perception of their governments’ policy-
making capacity and its room to maneuver that is the cause of this decrease in electoral turnout.  
Linking voter turnout with the concept central to this thesis, political trust, most studies 
have reported that countries in which political trust or satisfaction with democracy is higher, levels 
of voter turnout are higher as well (e.g. Clarke et al., 2004; Karp and Banducci, 2008; Norris, 2002). 
The finding that awareness of constrained policy-making leads to lower voter turn-out does there-
fore  make it plausible that it affects political trust as well. If voters in countries with a high integra-
tion in the world market trust their governments to live up to their policy expectations just as much 
as voters in countries with a lower degree of economic integration, why would their likeliness to vote 
differ? In short then, the first expectation guiding this thesis can be formulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher a country’s level of economic globalization, the lower is its citizens’ political 
trust. 
 
Admittedly, this hypothesis does not capture the actual mechanism as outlined above, since it does 
not account for the degree to which governments are actually constrained in their policy-making 
abilities. However, relying on survey-data, it is hard to include a measure that does capture the pub-
lic’s perception of its government’s policy-making capacities. Studies comparable to this thesis (such 
as that of Fischer, 2012 and Steiner, 2010) have the same problem, and do not provide a solution for 
it either. It is therefore the paragraphs above that should add plausibility to the idea that a confirma-
tion of the hypothesis means that it is indeed globalization’s constraining effect on policy-making 
that leads to a decrease in political trust.  
 
2.3.2.  Critical considerations 
It is important to keep in mind that there has been very little research on the relation between glob-
alization and political trust. In addition, there are more reasons to be careful when interpreting data 
concerning this relation. One reason is that the only existing research confirming a negative relation 
between globalization and political trust (Fischer’s) does have methodological limitations. Firstly, it 
uses a worldwide sample. As Held et al. have argued, globalization should be understood as a pro-
cess or a set of processes that do not follow linear logic or have equal impact on different societies 
across the world (1999: 27). It is therefore problematic to argue that economic globalization has a 
similar effect on political trust in countries all around the world, because there are so many other 
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factors that might interfere in this relation. Secondly, the study controls only for two variables on the 
country-level: national income and population size. Other country-level variables that have an im-
pact on institutional performance and might affect political trust, such as the level of corruption, 
income inequality or party system – to name just a few – are not included in the model.  
 A second reason for caution is that some research has found that globalization has actually 
led to positive attitudes towards political institutions. Dreher and Voigt (2011) for example find that 
nation-state governments have a higher degree of credibility when they are a member of internation-
al organizations such as the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank. And both Torgler (2008) and Hes-
sami (2011) report that globalization has a positive effect on citizens’ trust in these international or-
ganizations. Surely the mechanisms at work here are of a different nature, since trust in international 
organizations follows quite a different logic than trust in national political institutions. As Torgler 
(2008) explains, trust in international organizations: “countries’ capacity to act globally by creating 
international networks guaranteeing information, goods and capital flows increase the demand for 
international stability. (…) Such conditions may foster trust in international organizations as the 
UN” (2008: 69). Such an explanation obviously does not make much sense when applying it to trust 
in national institutions. Despite such differences, these results do show that globalization affects 
political trust in diverging, almost contradictory ways. This again draws attention to the considera-
tion that one should be careful when interpreting the effect of globalization on trust. 
 Overall, the critical considerations presented here do not disprove the relation between 
globalization and political trust. Yet they do indicate that caution is needed when establishing this 
relation. One way to do this is to look at the separate effects of the different dimensions of globali-
zation as well. As argued before, the concept of globalization consists of an economic, a political 
and a cultural (or social) dimension. Following the logic of the ‘constrained domestic policy-making 
hypothesis’, it is mainly the economic dimension that is expected to have an effect on political trust. 
Most research summarized above is about economic openness and integration in the world market, 
instead of globalization in general. Indeed, it is mainly economic globalization that is said to con-
strain policy-making by national governments.  
Political globalization is less central to this reasoning.Yet it can still be said that elements of 
political globalization such as being a member of many international organizations and ratifying in-
ternational treaties constrain the possibility of independent national policy-making as well. Being a 
party to a treaty for example can directly affect a country’s policy options because it simply makes 
some policies impossible, or at least very costly. In addition, a country that plays a central role in the 
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international community might also be more sensible to the opinions and interests of other states. 
Scholars have argued that such countries are more easily ‘socialized’ to pursue certain policies be-
cause they more often follow ‘global scripts’ (e.g. Goodman and Jinks, 2004; Greenhill, 2010), and 
copy policies of their ‘sociocultural peers’ (Simmons and Elkins, 2004). In that sense, political glob-
alization might also have an indirect effect on the autonomy with which governments develop poli-
cies. A negative effect of political globalization on political trust would therefore be compatible with 
the framework of the constrained policy-making hypothesis, although the effect would be expected 
to be weaker.  
An effect of the third dimension of globalization, cultural globalization, on political trust 
could not be explained by this line of reasoning: it is hard to find a way in which cultural globaliza-
tion constrains governments in their policy-making. This is especially so because this dimension 
does not really capture globalization in relation to governments and the political leadership, but 
more in relation to society. This is not to say that cultural globalization has no effect on political 
trust at all. Topics like immigration might certainly have an impact on political trust (the next section 
describes one way in which it might do so). However, such an effect does not fit in the framework 
of the constrained policy-making hypothesis. From this viewpoint, an effect of cultural globalization 
on political trust is therefore not expected.   
When testing the effects of the separate dimensions of globalization on political trust, the 
expectation based on the constrained policy-making hypothesis therefore reads as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Economic globalization has a stronger negative relation with political trust than political 
globalization, and both have a stronger negative relation with political trust than cultural globaliza-
tion. 
 
In case this hypothesis is not supported, it would suggest that the first mechanism would need to be 
reconsidered, or that other mechanisms are at work as well. 
 
2.4. Globalization as a critical juncture for European politics 
The second mechanism distinguished in this thesis understands globalization as having a diverging 
effect on different social groups. It is not considered plausible that globalization has a uniform effect 
on a whole population. In short, this mechanism supposes that globalization leads to new social 
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divisions and that these divisions can partly be understood in terms of trust. Firstly, it assumes that 
the political trust of citizens who oppose processes of globalization is lower than that of citizens 
who are in favor of these processes. And secondly, that this relation is more pronounced in coun-
tries that are more globalized. In that sense, it does not look at the way globalization constrains the 
power of governments, but rather focuses on the effect of globalization on the ‘demand-side’ of 
politics.  
 As Kriesi et al. (2006 and 2008) have argued, there are three distinct ways in which citizens 
can ‘win’ or ‘lose’ from globalization. These ways correspond closely to the dimensions of globaliza-
tion as distinguished in this thesis. Firstly, there is growing economic competition, brought about by 
the internationalization of production, the integration of product markets and the opening up of 
borders for labor from other countries. Secondly, globalization leads to growing cultural diversity. 
Some have experienced this development as a thread to the values and the collective identity of the 
autochthonous culture. In this case, we can speak of cultural competition. And thirdly, the opening 
up of borders has led to political competition between both national states themselves and states 
and supranational organizations, which has decreased the influence of national states (an argument 
which resembles the argument of the constrained domestic policy-making hypothesis). For people 
who strongly identify with the national community, this development will be interpreted as a loss, 
whereas cosmopolitan citizens will perceive it as a gain.  
 Kriesi et al. argue that together, these three consequences of globalization have led to a 
structural opposition between those who win and those who lose from globalization in Western 
Europe. The ‘winners’ have been labeled universalist or cosmopolitan, whereas those that lose have 
been referred to as the particularist or nationalist. Several scholars argue that these groups are in-
creasingly important in understanding the social divisions in Western European politics (e.g. Bovens 
et al., 2014). Because these groups are of a rather heterogeneous nature in the sense that they do not 
fit easily in the traditional structure of national politics, the established political parties have prob-
lems coming to terms with these new groups. Instead, it have mainly been the new populist parties 
that have mobilized this conflict in order to seek electoral support. In doing so, they have put issues 
related to globalization on the political agenda, such as immigration, European integration and eco-
nomic liberalization. The increasing importance of these issues has thus led to “the transformation 
of the political space and the repositioning of mainstream parties in this transformed space” (Kriesi, 
2010: 683). 
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The emergence of the political conflict between universalist and particularist groups has 
been linked to political trust. It seems that the political trust of ‘particularists’ is lower than that of 
‘universalists’. Definitions of populism – a concept inextricably linked to the particularist ‘family’ – 
have always had political distrust at their core (Mudde, 2004; Taggert, 2000). Indeed, political dis-
trust has been found to be an important predictor of support for populist parties (Fieschi and Hey-
wood, 2004). Focusing more specifically on the relation between citizens’ attitudes towards globali-
zation issues and political trust, Den Ridder et al. (2014) have recently found that there indeed is a 
strong correlation between both in the Netherlands: the trust people have in politicians tends to be 
much lower for people with a negative attitude towards globalization issues than people with a posi-
tive attitude towards these issues. And interestingly, Hessami (2011) has found a similar relation be-
tween attitudes towards globalization and trust in international organizations (being the WTO, the 
IMF and the World Bank). The first step here is therefore be to confirm this relation at the level of 
national governments, extending the scope from the Netherlands to Europe. This can be hypothe-
sized as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Respondents’ attitude towards globalization is positively related with political trust. 
 
For the reasons discussed above, this is not a very controversial expectation. However, much less is 
known about the direction of this relation is in terms of causality. Does a lower trust in politics lead 
to a more negative attitude towards globalization? Or does globalization have a stronger negative 
impact on the political trust of people with a negative attitude towards globalization than it has on 
people with a positive attitude? Den Ridder et al. seem to agree more with the former explanation, 
and argue that an already existing political distrust leads to negative attitudes towards globalization. 
These negative attitudes then should not be explained by substantial or ideological orientations, but 
rather by confidence in politics in general. People might see globalization as part of the agenda of a 
political elite they distrust, and therefore oppose it. And another possibility is that people are afraid 
of the structural changes they perceive because of an already existing distrust in politics, and that 
negative attitudes towards globalization are only a part of a larger societal discontent. This line of 
reasoning follows the logic of what Derks (2004) has coined ‘welfare populism’. This concept de-
scribes the idea that that negative attitudes towards the welfare state by the lower educated should be 
seen as consequences of feelings of social deprivation instead of consequences of an ideological doc-
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trine. In short, attitudes towards globalization do not affect political distrust in this reasoning, but 
political distrust affects attitudes towards globalization. 
However, the mechanism proposed here assumes that the relation works the other way 
around. It emphasizes that despite the fact that people have opposed globalization issues, processes 
such as European integration and the influx of immigrants have continued gradually. Moreover, 
although opposition towards issues related to globalization has been prominent on the demand side 
of politics (voters), this opposition has until recently been far less clearly expressed at the supply side 
(parties). This is what Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) have argued, which implies that the pref-
erences of voters related to globalization have been underrepresented in politics. As a consequence, 
voters opposing processes of globalization might have perceived their government as unresponsive 
to their needs, resulting in political distrust. Häusermann and Kriesi follow this logic when they as-
sume that “structural ‘losers’ of globalization develop more generally negative attitudes towards po-
litical institutions and processes” (2015, 216).  In other words, globalization leads to a gap in terms 
of political trust between those who oppose globalization and those who endorse it.  
Following this logic, it would be expected that this gap in terms of trust increases as globaliza-
tion increases. If it are indeed issues of globalization that have a negative impact on the political trust 
of particularists (and possibly a positive impact of that of universalists), this impact should increase 
as globalization increases. Besides expecting that individuals with a more positive attitude towards 
globalization are likely to have a higher political trust (hypothesis 3), I therefore also expect that this 
relation is stronger in countries that are more globalized. This idea is expressed in the fourth hy-
pothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The relation between individuals’ attitudes towards globalization and political trust is 
stronger in countries that are more globalized. 
  
The new insights that the testing of this hypothesis provides are interesting in the first place because 
they contribute to the understanding of the supposed new social divisions and their relation with 
globalization. The question whether more globalization reinforces the emergence of these divisions 
has not been empirically addressed yet. In addition, it also provides a test-case for comparing expec-
tations in the line of Den Ridder et al. with expectations comparable to that of Kriesi and Häuser-
mann. In case the hypothesis is supported, it would indicate that the logic of Den Ridder et al. alone 
does not suffice to explain the relation between attitudes towards globalization and political trust. 
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Instead, it would support the view that globalization has a stronger impact on the political trust of 
people with a negative attitude towards globalization than it has on people with a positive attitude. 
Or in other words, that the gap between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization increases as globaliza-
tion increases.  
Comparing the mechanism outlined here with the first mechanism, it is different in two 
ways: firstly because it is not the supposed policy-constraining effect of globalization per se that is 
assumed to lower political trust, but rather people’s attitude towards globalization and the way gov-
ernments deal with these attitudes. Secondly, this mechanism is not limited to economic globaliza-
tion. Cultural globalization is supposed to have the same effect, or might even be more important 
here. In fact, the negative attitude towards globalization of these particularists is often argued to be a 
consequence of cultural instead of economic considerations. According to Hainmueller, negative 
attitudes towards immigration should not be seen as a consequence of increasing economic competi-
tion, but rather as opposition to cultural diversity (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006 and 2007; Hain-
mueller and Hopkins, 2014). In a same vein, McLaren (2006) has argued that resistance to European 
unification is not driven by utilitarian material self-interest calculations, but by considerations of 
values and identity. And Wolfe and Mendelsohn (2005) have even argued that opposition to trade 
liberalization is more determined by values than material self-interest factors. In short, whereas the 
constrained policy-making hypothesis has no place for the cultural dimension of globalization in its 
logic, it is central to this second mechanism.   
 Therefore, I again test the effect of the different dimensions of globalization separately. For 
this mechanism it is more difficult to express a clear expectation guiding this test. One reason for 
this difficulty is that the actual functioning of this second mechanism depends on how the first 
mechanism works. In the case that globalization has a trust-lowering effect on citizens in general, 
this effect is supposed to be reinforced when people have a negative attitude towards globalization, 
while it is tempered for people who have a positive attitude towards it. In case it does not, it means 
that globalization has a negative effect on the political trust of the ‘particularists’, whereas it actually 
has a positive effect on that of the ‘universalists’. In the second place, all three dimensions of globali-
zation are supposed to create winners and losers in a different way, all three dimensions might have 
an effect according to this second mechanism. However, for the arguments discussed in the previ-
ous paragraph, cultural globalization is expected to have the strongest interaction effect with indi-
viduals’ attitude towards globalization. In other words: 
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Hypothesis 5: Cultural globalization has a stronger effect on the relation between individuals’ attitudes 
towards globalization and political trust, than political and economic globalization. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Case and data selection 
As argued before, globalization has a different impact on societies across the world. The way global-
ization affects trust might be dependent on political culture, regime type and many other country-
level variables. This means that it might be problematic to look at the relation between globalization 
and political trust worldwide. In addition, the theory of globalization as a critical juncture has been 
based on developments specific to European countries, and the second mechanism as described 
above therefore mainly applies to those countries. For these two reasons, the focus of this thesis is 
narrowed to European countries, as it limits variation in country-level variables and makes the re-
sults fit better in the framework of globalization as a critical juncture.  
 For the analysis of these European countries this study uses data provided by the European 
Social Survey (ESS). The advantage of this dataset is that it – in contrast to the European Value Sur-
vey – includes measures of all relevant individual-level variables, such as political trust and attitude 
towards globalization issues. Furthermore, the ESS allows for longitudinal comparisons because it 
has been conducted in six waves from 2002 to 2012. In total the ESS incorporates data from 36 
countries, of which 32 are available for longitudinal comparison. For theoretical reasons, the focus is 
further narrowed down to 29 of those 32 countries (leading to a dataset including 267.595 respond-
ents). Russia, Israel and Turkey are excluded in order to limit the variation in country-level indicators 
and national political cultures. In addition, a dummy variable is included to control for a difference 
in effect of globalization in Eastern and Western European countries. All countries that were found-
ing members of the OECD are coded as Western European countries here1, with exception of 
Greece because globalization is supposed to affect Greece in a way that is more similar to Eastern- 
than Western European countries. The remaining countries are coded as Eastern-European (the 
reference category).  
 
                                                 
1 The European founding members are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
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3.2. Dependent variables 
The dependent variable of this thesis is trust in parliament. This variable is measured on a ten-point 
scale, with 0 meaning having no trust in parliament at all, and 10 meaning complete trust in parlia-
ment.. Trust in government specifically would be more ideal for testing the constrained policy-
making hypothesis (i.e. hypothesis 1 and 2), but this indicator is not available in the ESS. From the 
perspective of this thesis however, trust in a country’s parliament is very close to trust in govern-
ment: the legislative power of parliaments is restricted in the same way as the executive power of 
governments. Approaching both institutions in a similar way is therefore not uncommon in political 
science (e.g. Job, 2005), and trust or confidence in parliament is often used as a measure of political 
trust (e.g. Newton, 2001; Tolbert and Mossberger, 2006).  
 It might be argued that satisfaction with government, which is measured by the ESS, could 
be an alternative dependent variable. The advantage of this variable would be that it would capture 
respondents’ evaluation of government specifically. Yet there are important differences between the 
concept of satisfaction, and the concept of trust that is central to this thesis. Scholars have argued 
that satisfaction refers to an evaluation of a specific performance or service, in this case being gov-
ernment performance (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003). Trust on the other hand describes a 
more structural attitude and is more encompassing. Because the theory of this thesis is more about 
structural attitudes than relatively short-term evaluations, trust is a more interesting dependent vari-
able for this thesis, and trust in parliament is chosen as the dependent variable2.  
 
3.3. Independent variables 
Globalization. In the last decade, several indices have been developed that try to measure globalization 
as a multifaceted concept. Examples are the Foreign Policy Magazine globalization index, the Glob-
alIndex (Raab et al. 2008), and the Maastricht Globalisation Index (Figge and Martens 2014). How-
ever, the KOF Index of globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al. 2008a) has come to be the index 
that is used most. Since 2008, over 100 studies have used this index, the majority of them as the 
main explanatory variable (see Potrafke, 2015 for an overview of these studies). In defining globali-
zation, the KOF Index (composed by the KOF (‘Konjunkturforschungsstelle) Swiss Economic In-
stitute, hence the naming) follows Clark (2000), referring to it as “the process of creating networks 
                                                 
2 As a comparison, an additional analysis was conducted with government satisfaction as the dependent variable. The 
results of this analysis (which are not presented here) were similar to those of the analysis with trust in parliament as a 
dependent variable, but showed less effect of the country-level variables.  
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of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows 
including people, information and ideas, capital, and goods” (p. 86). It includes 23 indicators, which 
are used to create three sub-indices: one index of political globalization, one of economic globaliza-
tion and one of social globalization (it should be noted that I am referring to this latter category as 
cultural globalization).  
The economic index measures actual economic flows and restrictions. It consists of 
measures of actual financial flows (such as total trade and foreign direct investment) on the one 
hand, and restrictions (such as import barriers and tariff rates) on the other. The political index cap-
tures countries’ institutional links with other countries and international organizations. More specifi-
cally, it includes measures of (among others) a country’s membership in international organizations, 
embassies on its territory and ratification of international treaties. The social (or cultural) index lastly 
is about the exchange of people, information, images and ideas, and is composed by using data on 
personal contact (with foreign cultures), data on information flows (the use of internet and news 
media) and data on cultural proximity (for a precise description of the variables included and the 
weighting techniques see Dreher et al., 2008a). Combining these sub-indices, one overall index is 
created. 
Besides the fact that it accounts for the multifaceted nature of globalization, the advantage of 
the KOF index is that it is available for up to 208 countries over the period 1970-2010. However, it 
evidently is not possible to develop an index that can truly measure globalization as if it were a 
thermometer. Every index by definition has some disadvantages that should be taken into account, 
and the KOF index has some too. For example, the measure of social globalization includes indica-
tors such as the number of McDonald’s restaurants and the amount of IKEA stores. In this respect, 
the KOF index measures globalization as a concept related to Westernization. Globalization is not 
necessarily the same as Westernization though, but can also take non-Western forms such as Islamic 
globalization (Potrafke, 2015).  
 
Attitude towards globalization. All waves of the ESS measure respondents’ attitude to several globaliza-
tion issues. For this thesis, three are most relevant: respondents’ attitude towards cultural diversity, 
towards European unification and towards economic integration. These three items are measured by 
the following questions: 1) is your country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants, 2) 
has European integration gone too far or should it go further, and 3) is immigration bad or good for 
your country’s economy (all these questions are measured on a ten-point scale). Admittedly, the atti-
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tude towards economic integration is about topics like free trade agreements just as much as it is 
about the consequences of immigration for the economy, and the third question only takes the latter 
into account. However, as the European Social Survey does not measure attitudes towards such top-
ics, the issue is only measured by this indicator. Combined, I believe these three items still provide a 
good indicator of respondents’ general attitude towards globalization. All three items are weighted 
equally in the scale into which the three indicators are combined. 
  
3.4. Control variables 
On the country-level, this study controls for two other elements besides globalization that might 
have an impact on political trust (by adding country-level indicators to the ESS dataset manually). 
Firstly the economic situation of a country, and secondly the political performance of a state. The 
economic situation of a country is measured using the following indicators: 
 
 Economic performance, measured by a country’s GNP based on data provided by the IMF. 
Many authors have argued that individuals’ trust in political institutions is strongly related 
with their economic situation. A country’s general level of economic performance is there-
fore an important indicator to control for when testing the relation between globalization 
and political trust.  
 Income inequality, measured by the Gini-coefficient based on data provided by Eurostat. It has 
been argued that a higher degree of income inequality can be a strong determinant of politi-
cal trust (e.g. Uslaner and Brown, 2005) and it is therefore important to include it in the 
model. Income inequality might be especially relevant for testing Hypothesis 4, since more 
income inequality might mean that ‘losers’ of globalization lose even harder, while ‘winners’ 
are winning even more.  
 Public social expenditure, measured as a country’s aggregate social expenditure as a percentage 
of its GDP, based on data provided by the OECD. Social expenditure is an important con-
trol variable as it is essential for the theory of the constrained policy-making hypothesis. Alt-
hough the effect of globalization and economic openness on a country’s amount of public 
spending is disputed (see the above-explained debate between the efficiency hypothesis ver-
sus the compensation hypothesis), scholars agree that social expenditure is one of the most 
important tools governments have to compensate for the effect of globalization. This means 
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that the hypothesized negative effect globalization has on political trust can be compensated 
for by increasing social expenditure, and a positive effect of social expenditure on political 
trust is therefore expected. 
 Population size. Strictly speaking, population size is of course no economic variable. However, 
it is included in the model for two reasons. Firstly, controlling for population size is a way to 
account for the size of the domestic market (e.g. Fischer and Somogyi, 2011). It is a well-
established finding that the size of the domestic market matters with regard to the pressure 
domestic firms perceive to integrate in the international market. A larger domestic market 
might imply that the pressure on domestic firms to expand decreases, and that the competi-
tive pressure by foreign competitors on domestic economic policies is lowered. Secondly, the 
variable might capture a country’s heterogeneity concerning trust (e.g. Alesina and LaFerrara, 
2002).  
 
The second element this study controls for at the country-level is the effect of political institutions. 
Obviously, a framework in which the understanding of political trust is based on institutional per-
formance should account for the actual performance and structure of a country’s political institu-
tions. And what’s more, several recent studies show that the political trust of higher educated people 
is more sensitive for the quality of political institutions than that of lower educated citizens (e.g. 
Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012). Because attitudes towards globalization have been strongly linked 
with the level of education, it might be the case that the relation between attitudes of globalization 
and political trust is weakened in countries with poor institutional performance. The effect of politi-
cal institutions is measured using the following indicators: 
 
 Level of perceived corruption. Corruption evidently is crucial for citizens’ evaluation of institu-
tional performances. Transparency International has developed a corruption-index defining 
corruption as the “misuse of public power for private benefit”, ranking countries on a scale 
from 100 (not corrupt) to 0 (highly corrupt). It is useful that this index measures perceived cor-
ruption, which is more relevant for citizens’ political trust than an ‘objective’ measure would 
be. 
 Quality of democracy. Just like corruption, it is evident that the quality of a democracy can be 
essential to citizens’ evaluation of institutional performances. In terms of measurement, 
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there is a broad range of indices measuring the quality of democracies to choose from. This 
thesis uses the Democracy Barometer, developed by Bühlmann et al.. What makes this index 
very useful is that it is designed specifically to determine the quality of established democra-
cies. As Bühlmann et al. argue, most indexes “are too unsubtle to measure the fine but obvi-
ously existing differences in the quality of democracy between countries” (2008: 3). Since I 
am mostly interested in countries with a relatively high level of democracy, an index account-
ing for the subtler differences between these countries is rather useful.   
 Effective number of parties. It has been argued that more consensual democracies offer more 
space for populist and anti-globalization sentiments to be expressed than majoritarian de-
mocracies (e.g. Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007). Therefore, it could be the case that people 
opposing globalization are more confident that their viewpoints will be represented in par-
liaments in more consensual democracies than in majoritarian democracies. This could in 
turn temper the relation between one’s attitude towards globalization and political trust. The 
most common indicator used to measure a country’s party system (besides Lijphart’s index 
(Lijphart, 1999), which only incorporates 19 European countries) is the effective number of par-
liamentary parties (ENPP), which is a measure developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). 
This thesis uses data provided by Gallagher (2015), and takes the measure of the number of 
parties in the elections held most recently before the ESS-edition under consideration.  
 
On the individual level, this study controls for socio-demographic variables that fit into the institu-
tional performance model of trust. It is a well-established finding that citizens’ socio-economic sta-
tus and available human capital are essential in this respect. I therefore control for respondents’ eco-
nomic background by looking at their occupation. In the ESS occupation is measured using the In-
ternational Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), which I have recoded into the ten 
basis categories of this classification3 (using clerks as reference category). Secondly, education is con-
trolled for by including the ESS’s measure using the European version of the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ES-ISCED) in the model (using the ‘upper tier upper secondary’-
category as reference category). This measure consists of seven categories (ranging from ‘lower than 
secondary education’ to ‘higher tertiary education’) and a residual category (‘not possible to harmo-
                                                 
3 The ten categories are 1) Armed Forces 2) Managers 3) Professionals 4) Technicians, associate professionals 5) Service 
and sales workers 6) Clerks 7) Agriculture and fishery workers 8) Craft workers 9) Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 10) Elementary workers. 
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nize into ES-ISCED’). Because respondents falling under this latter category behave very similar to 
respondents in the two highest categories of education (Bachelor-level degree and Master-level de-
gree) with regard to their relation with income and trust, and because results would be significantly 
distorted when excluding this category, this residual category too is included in the model. Lastly, 
Tucker et al. (2002) argue that someone’s subjective evaluation of the economy might be more im-
portant than his or her objective position. A third individual-level control variable is therefore in-
cluded measuring respondents’ evaluation of the present state of their country’s economy (measured 
on a ten-point scale).  
 A second set of individual level control variables is included concerning respondents’ politi-
cal values and general trust. Political ideology firstly is measured on a ten-point scale referring to 
respondents’ left-right self-placement. Because the effect of ideology has been reported to be curvi-
linear by some research (e.g. Steenbergen et al. 2007), its square is also included. Secondly, people’s 
ideological engagement is controlled for by including a dichotomous variable measuring if people 
feel closer to one party than another (not doing so being the reference category). Thirdly, people’s 
political interest is measured by including a four-category item asking how interested people are in 
politics. Fourthly, taking into account the argument of Den Ridder et al. (2014) that negative atti-
tudes towards globalization might be a consequence of a general lack of trust, and more in general 
the psychological explanation of political trust which understands it as connected to someone’s gen-
eral trust, this study also controls for people’s trust in other people (which is measured on a ten-
point scale). Fifthly, this study controls for age. And finally, it controls for gender by the inclusion of 
a dummy variable for being female. 
As a final control a variable controlling for a time-effect is included. In the period under 
consideration political trust tended to decrease over time, presumably partly due to the financial and 
economic crisis. Not controlling for a time-effect might therefore negatively affect the correlations 
between trust and independent variables. Although the GDP per capita control variable and the 
individual-level variable measuring respondents’ evaluation of the state of their economy are sup-
posed to account for development such as the financial and economic crisis, they might not have 
been fully captured by the control-variables included in the model. The same goes for other devel-
opments that have affected political trust.    
 It might be argued that respondents’ attitude towards globalization is an important explana-
tory variable for the third and fourth hypothesis, and should therefore be included as a control in the 
models testing the first two hypotheses as well. However, this variable has the problem that it has 
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many missing cases (112.325 respondents on a total of 267.595 respondents are missing), due to the 
fact that the three single indicators it consists of all have a considerable amount of system-missing 
cases. Including this variable might therefore produce distorted results, so it is not included in the 
model testing the first two hypotheses. Yet for testing the third and fourth hypotheses this variable 
is of course indispensable, so it is included in the models testing them. In order to control whether 
the effect-sizes of the final models are not distorted too much by the missing cases, I compare the 
changes between the first two and the latter models.  
 
3.5. Analyses 
For the first mechanism, the relation between globalization and political trust is analyzed using a 
multi-level model with both individual and country-level indicators (which are specified in Appendix 
Table 1). In addition, it is done using cross-country longitudinal data, and the model therefore con-
sists of three levels: the individual level, the country level and the country-year level. The additional 
value of comparing countries in a longitudinal way is that it allows for a comparison that is less dis-
torted by country-specific characteristics, making it clearer to what extent variation in trust can be 
attributed to the effect of globalization. To test Hypothesis 1 and 2 a model is used that includes the 
measures of the three different dimensions of globalization, i.e. the sub-indices of the KOF-index. 
The explanatory strength of these dimensions is then compared. 
 For testing Hypothesis 3, 4 and 5 then, the same model is used with inclusion of the globali-
zation attitude variable and its interaction with the three different dimensions of globalization. The 
interaction is included because for testing the fourth and fifth hypothesis, this study looks at the 
cross-level interactions between the individual-level attitude towards globalization and the country-
level of globalization. In addition, I also include a cross-level interaction variable of attitudes towards 
globalization and the East-West dummy variable as a control. It might be the case that the relation 
between attitudes towards globalization and political trust is mainly a Western European phenome-
non. Indeed, the literature on the new social divisions as a consequence of globalization focuses 
almost exclusively on Western European countries. Because Western European countries are in gen-
eral more globalized, including the globalization attitude variable only in interaction with the three 
dimensions globalization is therefore likely to overestimate the effect of these variables on political 
trust. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive results 
The first step of this analysis is to investigate the distribution of the dependent and independent 
variables. Figure 1 presents the variation of political trust across countries and time. Two main pat-
terns can be observed from this figure, both of which are in accordance with earlier research. First, 
relatively low trust-scores are especially found in Eastern European countries, whereas average trust 
is highest in Western and especially Northwestern European countries. With a mean level of 4.3 for 
all countries and average scores of countries ranging from 2.1 (Bulgaria) to 6.2 (Denmark), the level 
Figure 1. Political trust across countries and time (dots in the blocks represent respondents). 
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of political trust varies substantively among the countries. Second, in general there is a declining 
trend in political trust. Although there are some exceptions (all of which are Western European), this  
negative trend can be found in the majority of countries.  
Moving to the variation of general globalization (meaning the score on the overall index of 
globalization, consisting of the three sub-indices of globalization) by country (Figure 2), the order of 
the countries is very similar: Eastern European countries (and Iceland) constitute the less globalized 
half of the countries under analysis, Western European countries the more globalized half. The fact 
that the distribution of both the dependent and the independent variables so closely follows the 
East-West divide, justifies the inclusion of the Eastern-Western Europe dummy variable. This varia-
ble controls for differences in the variation of political trust between Eastern and Western European 
countries, which without the inclusion of this control variable might have been attributed to the 
effects of one of the country-level indicators.  
Furthermore, the East-West pattern indicates that the more globalized countries are also the 
countries with a higher GDP and better institutional performance scores. Indeed, common sense 
would argue that there might be a high correlation between some of the country-level variables, 
Figure 2. Globalization across countries (average score for period 2002-2012). 
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making high levels of multicollinearity a potential problem. However, looking at the collinearity sta-
tistics when including only the country-level variables in an OLS-regression model with political 
trust as dependent variable (Appendix Table 2), it turns out that collinearity statistics are not prob-
lematic. Although not all VIF-scores are close to 1, for all of them the score is well under 10. What 
is notable as well is that there is sufficient variation among the three sub-indices of globalization to 
not pose serious multicollinearity problems. Apparently countries which are highly globalized with 
regard to for example the economic dimension, are not necessarily equally highly globalized from a 
political or cultural perspective.  
 
4.2. Constrained domestic policy-making 
The argument of the constrained domestic policy-making hypothesis is that globalization constrains 
governments in shaping policy outcomes, leading to a decrease in political trust at the individual 
level. The multilevel model that is used to test this argument is presented in Table 1. Including all 
variables, the sample still consists of 161.188 respondents. As a first observation, it is notable that 
almost all individual-level variables have a statistically significant effect, whereas the majority of the 
country-level variables has not4. Indeed, the estimated residual standard deviations of the three levels 
of the model show that most variance is situated at the individual level (about 65 percent of the total 
variance, while differences between countries account for 18 percent and differences between coun-
try-years for 17 percent). The variance at the levels of countries and country-years is sufficient to 
justify the multi-level model, but the differences in variation between the different levels are im-
portant to consider when interpreting the results. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that higher levels of globalization lead to a decrease in political trust. 
The results presented in Table 1 do not provide strong support for this hypothesis. Although the 
effect of economic globalization is indeed negative, it is not statistically significant. This finding con-
tradicts the findings of Fischer (2012). To put this result in perspective however, it is useful to place 
it in the context of the other country-level variables, most of which have no statistically significant 
effect either. Since country-level variables that are commonly used in relation with political trust – 
such as economic performance and the quality of democracy – do not have a statistically significant 
effect on political trust, it is a bit less surprising that a less commonly used indicator as economic 
globalization does not have a statistically significant effect either.  
                                                 
4 When interpreting the effects, note that the coefficient are unstandardized. Appendix Table 1 shows the range of all 
variables, making it easier to interpret the effect size of the coefficients. 
 34 
 
Table 1. Multilevel OLS models: Impact of globalization on political trust. 
               Model 1 
 b     se 
Individual-level variables  
Trust in people       0.161*** (0.002) 
Interested in politics       0.329*** (0.007) 
Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties       0.320*** (0.011) 
Satisfied with present state of economy        0.351*** (0.003) 
Left-right placement        0.130*** (0.008) 
Left-right placement squared      -0.010*** (0.001) 
Age      -0.002*** (0.000) 
Gender (Female) -0.018 (0.011) 
Education  
Lower than secondary -0.036 (0.028) 
Lower secondary      -0.085*** (0.021) 
Lower tier upper secondary      -0.103*** (0.020) 
Advanced vocational -0.001 (0.025) 
Lower tertiary, BA-level      0.135*** (0.024) 
Higher tertiary, MA-level      0.123*** (0.025) 
Not possible to harmonize    0.274* (0.126) 
Occupation  
Armed Forces  0.185* (0.084) 
Managers -0.012 (0.024) 
Professionals     0.081*** (0.022) 
Technicians and associate professionals -0.006 (0.020) 
Service and sales workers -0.033 (0.020) 
Agriculture and fishery workers    0.111** (0.032) 
Craft workers      -0.144*** (0.022) 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers      -0.198*** (0.024) 
Elementary workers -0.025 (0.023) 
Macro-level variables  
Economic globalization  -0.012 (0.010) 
Political globalization   -0.021* (0.009) 
Cultural globalization   0.027* (0.012) 
Population 0.000 (0.000) 
GDP per Capita 0.005 (0.005) 
Gini Inequality  -0.006 (0.017) 
Public social spending/GDP   0.036* (0.019) 
Quality of Democracy 0.034 (0.021) 
Corruption  -0.009 (0.008) 
Effective number of parties  -0.052 (0.059) 
Eastern-Western Europe 0.116 (0.268) 
Time effect (ESS Round)     -0.097** (0.041) 
(Intercept)  -0.284 (1.413) 
Variance components  
Country (SD)            0.349 
Country-years (SD)            0.354 
Individual (SD)            2.014 
N            161188 
AIC            683983 
Model is estimated by OLS-regression; ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 (two-tailed tests). 
Note: coefficients are unstandardized. 
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 Following this reasoning, a statistically significant effect of the other two dimensions of 
globalization would be remarkable as well. Yet both political and cultural globalization do have a 
statistically significant effect. Moreover, they are the only country-level variables that do so, together 
with public social spending. Hypothesis 2 makes a prediction about the relative effect of those di-
mensions. It expects that when comparing the three dimensions, economic globalization would have 
the strongest negative effect, and political globalization the second strongest negative effect. Both 
dimensions are expected to have a stronger negative effect than cultural globalization. With econom-
ic globalization not having a statistically significant effect, this hypothesis is not fully supported. 
However, the results do support the prediction that political globalization has a stronger negative 
effect than cultural globalization. In fact, while the effect of political globalization is statistically sig-
nificant negative, the effect of cultural globalization is statistically significant positive.  
 How to explain this effect of the political and cultural dimensions of globalization? As dis-
cussed in the theory section, political globalization does have the potential to constrain national gov-
ernments in their policy-making. Firstly, because diffusion of policy-making can directly restrict gov-
ernments’ policy options since ratifying treaties and agreements can render certain policies impossi-
ble. Secondly, because being a more prominent member of the international community might ‘so-
cialize’ governments to pursue certain policies. The negative effect of political globalization thus fits 
in the framework of the constrained policy-making hypothesis. Of course, this explanation is not a 
definitive explanation, especially because the empirical results do not report about the actual degree 
to which governments are constrained in their policy-making. The question whether this is actually 
the mechanism that the results indicate is therefore close to speculation. In addition, if it is indeed 
the constraining effect that explains this negative effect, a statistically significant effect of economic 
globalization would be expected as well, which is not the case. From the theoretical perspective of 
this thesis however, this explanation remains the most plausible one.   
 The finding that cultural globalization does not have a negative effect on political trust too is 
compatible with the argument of the constrained policy-making hypothesis. However, the positive 
effect as reported is somewhat surprising from this perspective, and the framework proposed here 
does not have a direct explanation for it. After all, cultural globalization cannot be said to increase the 
policy-making capacities of governments. It is therefore tempting to start speculating. Recalling that 
immigration is only a small part of cultural globalization and consists of elements such as tourism 
and usage of new communication technologies as well, it can be argued that citizens in more cultur-
ally globalized countries become more knowledgeable about the life circumstances in other countries 
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and more ‘cosmopolitan’. This might have the effect that citizens start to appreciate their own dem-
ocratic institutions more. It might also have the effect that citizens experience their national gov-
ernment less as playing a central role in their life, and therefore as less threatening. Yet such explana-
tions are at this moment not more than speculation, and the results presented here do not provide 
evidence for them.     
4.2.1.  Effect of control variables 
Turning to the control variables at the macro-level, only two others have a statistically significant 
effect: public social spending, and the variable controlling for a time effect. With regard to the theo-
retical framework, the positive effect of social expenditure is interesting. As outlined in the theory 
section the constrained policy-making hypothesis assumes that social spending is one of the most 
important tools governments have to compensate for the effect of globalization. And indeed, the 
results support the idea that a presumed negative trust-effect of globalization can be counteracted by 
increasing social spending, because public social spending has a statistically significant positive ef-
fect. Secondly, the most plausible explanation for the negative effect of the time-variable is the fi-
nancial and economic crisis. It is telling that the countries that have been hit the hardest by the crisis 
(Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Iceland and Spain) are among the countries with the most negative trend 
(see Figure 1). Apparently the GDP per capita-variable and the variable measuring the subjective 
evaluation of the economy do not fully capture the negative consequences of this crisis.  
 Coming to the effect of the other country-level variables, it should be noted that this is not 
the first multilevel-analysis to report so little country-level variables having an effect on political 
trust. Paxton (2007) for example finds no positive effect for the quality of a country’s democracy 
either. And using the European Social Survey just like this thesis, Van der Meer (2010) too finds no 
relation between economic performance and political trust. A plausible explanation is that much of 
the effect of country-level indicators is captured by the individual level variables. The fact that the 
East-West variable has no statistically significant effect, whereas Figure 1 indicated a clear relation 
between political trust and region (countries being Eastern or Western European), at least indicates 
that the differences between these countries have been sufficiently captured by other variables. Still, 
it remains remarkable that none of the variables like economic performance, corruption and quality of 
democracy has a statistically significant effect, while the political and cultural dimensions of globali-
zation have. 
    The individual level variables then are the predictors with the strongest effect. All but the 
gender-variable have a statistically significant effect. These effects are in accordance with previous 
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literature. Political interest and engagement (being close to a party) both have a positive effect. Eval-
uation of the present state of the economy has a positive effect too, and turns out to be the predic-
tor with the strongest effect. Both a linear and a curvilinear effect were found for left-right self-
placement, meaning that political trust is higher for people on the extreme right than for people on 
the extreme left, but is highest for respondents in the middle-categories. Newton and Norris (2010) 
report a similar effect. Regarding age earlier studies report mixed results, but the negative effect 
found here has been reported by previous studies as well (e.g. Anderson and LoTempio, 2002). 
Turning to the education variable, the results show that trust increases for respondents as education 
increases, as would be expected. Finally, a similar pattern is found for the occupation variable in the 
sense that the trust of white-collar workers is higher than that of manual workers (although elemen-
tary workers and respondents working in agriculture are an exception).  
 
4.3. Attitudes towards globalization and interaction effects 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that respondents’ attitude towards globalization is positively related with their 
political trust. Figure 3 displays the average correlation between attitudes towards globalization and 
political trust across countries and time. The figure shows a consistent trend: in every country, the 
attitude towards globalization is positively related with political trust. This is of course without con-
trolling for other variables, but serves as a first indication. Looking at the strength of the correlation 
across countries, the correlation seems to be stronger in Western European countries such as Fin-
land, Great Britain and Sweden, and less strong in Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, 
Poland and Ukraine. This again justifies the inclusion of the Eastern-Western Europe dummy varia-
ble, now with regard to testing the hypotheses predicting an interaction effect between attitudes to-
wards globalization and the actual globalization of a country (Hypothesis 4 and 5). As a final obser-
vation, the figure also gives an indication of the average attitude of towards globalization across 
countries (by displaying the of the dots along the x-axis). Here there is no clear pattern in the order 
of the countries in terms of the East-West divide or other country-level variables. Although the atti-
tude in Northwestern European countries is in general relatively positive towards globalization, the 
attitude in countries like the UK and France is relatively negative.  
Table 2 presents the results of the model which is used to test Hypothesis 3, as well as Hy-
pothesis 4 and 5. The model differs from the first model due to the inclusion of the globalization 
attitude variable, and by the inclusion of the interaction variables. Because of the inclusion of the 
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attitude variable, the sample-size decreases significantly (from 161.188 to 89.626). Yet despite the 
smaller sample size the effects are similar to those reported in model 1. The effect-sizes of the inde-
pendent variables differ, and the effect of two variables ceases to be statistically significant (age and 
time-effect), but the general picture remains the same.  
 The only interaction effect of globalization attitudes and a dimension of globalization which 
is not statistically significant, is the model including the interaction with economic globalization 
(model 2). In this model, the attitude towards globalization does have a statistically significant posi-
tive effect on trust by itself. This finding is thus in accordance with the expectation of Hypothesis 3.  
Figure 3. Relation between globalization attitude and political trust across countries and time. 
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In the other two models, the globalization attitude variable does not have a statistically sig-
nificant effect on itself. However, in these models the interaction effect with globalization is statisti-
cally significant. By only looking at the numbers, it is difficult to say whether or not these results 
support the prediction of Hypothesis 3 that attitudes towards globalization have a positive effect on 
political trust, because the variable should be interpreted in combination with the interaction effects. 
In order to visualize how these effects work together, they are plotted in Figure 4 and 5. These fig-
ures show the estimated effect of attitudes towards globalization on political trust for the lowest and 
highest score of political and cultural globalization, and for the region in which a respondent lives 
(i.e. whether a respondent lives in an Eastern or Western European country). In both figures, the 
effect of attitudes towards globalization on trust is positive. In other words, political trust is higher 
for people who are more positive about processes of globalization. It should be noted that the effect 
is depending on a country’s degree of globalization, as well whether a country is Eastern or Western 
European. In Eastern European countries and less globalized countries the effect is weaker, and 
probably not statistically significant. With regard to Western European counties and more globalized 
countries however the results do provide support for Hypothesis 3. This finding thus supports the 
argument that there is a gap between ‘losers of globalization’ and ‘winners of globalization’ (I will 
use these terms to refer to citizens with a positive attitude towards globalization and a negative atti-
tude towards globalization respectively) in terms of trust  
Besides showing a positive relation of globalization attitudes on political trust, the results in 
Table 2 thus also show that the strength of this relation depends on the region in which respondents 
live: the interaction effect of globalization attitudes and the East-West dummy variable is statistically 
significant. Looking again at the visualized effects displayed in Figure 4 and 5, they show that the 
effect of globalization attitudes on political trust is stronger in Western European countries than in 
Eastern European countries. This was expected, because the emerging division between winners and 
losers of globalization has often been described as a Western European phenomenon.  
The main reason for including this East-West interaction variable into the model was to pre-
vent an overestimation of the interaction effect of the dimensions of globalization and political trust. 
The results in Table 2 shows that the cross-level interaction effects of both cultural and political 
globalization with the inclusion of this control, globalization attitudes remain statistically significant 
(Figure 4 and 5 show an estimation of this effect as well). This finding support Hypothesis 4, which 
predicts that the relation between individuals’ attitudes towards globalization and political trust is 
stronger in countries that are more globalized. Assuming that there is a gap between the winners and  
 40 
 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b se b se b se 
Individual level variables 
Attitude towards globalization  0.107*** (0.032)   0.002 (0.045) 0.018 (0.047) 
Trust in people  0.141*** (0.003) 0.141*** (0.003) 0.140*** (0.003) 
Interested in politics  0.246*** (0.009) 0.246*** (0.009) 0.246*** (0.009) 
Feel closer to a particular party than others  0.283*** (0.014) 0.283*** (0.014) 0.283*** (0.014) 
How satisfied with present state of economy   0.318*** (0.003) 0.318*** (0.003) 0.318*** (0.003) 
Left-right placement  0.033*** (0.003) 0.033*** (0.003) 0.033*** (0.003) 
Left-right placement squared -0.007*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) 
Age  0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Gender  0.019 (0.015) 0.019 (0.015) 0.019 (0.015) 
Education 
Lower than secondary  0.053 (0.042) 0.053 (0.042) 0.053 (0.042) 
Lower secondary  0.006 (0.030) 0.006 (0.030) 0.008 (0.030) 
Lower tier upper secondary -0.018 (0.027)  -0.019     (0.027)   -0.017     (0.027)  
Advanced vocational  0.030 (0.035) 0.030 (0.035) 0.030 (0.035) 
Lower tertiary, BA-level  0.129*** (0.032) 0.131*** (0.032) 0.130*** (0.032) 
Higher tertiary, MA-level  0.084* (0.034) 0.085* (0.034) 0.084* (0.034) 
Not possible to harmonize   0.421** (0.163) 0.420** (0.162) 0.424** (0.163) 
Occupation 
Armed Forces  0.058 (0.112) 0.057 (0.112) 0.057 (0.112) 
Managers -0.045 (0.031)  -0.045 (0.031) -0.045 (0.031) 
Professionals  0.017 (0.028) 0.016 (0.028) 0.016 (0.028) 
Technicians, associate professionals -0.034 (0.026)  -0.035 (0.026) -0.034 (0.026) 
Service and sales workers -0.039 (0.027)  -0.039 (0.027) -0.039 (0.027) 
Agriculture and fishery workers  0.108* (0.043) 0.108* (0.043) 0.109* (0.043) 
Craft workers -0.094** (0.029)  -0.093** (0.029) -0.093** (0.029) 
Plant and machine operators -0.137*** (0.032)  -0.136*** (0.032) -0.137*** (0.032) 
Elementary workers -0.005 (0.030)  -0.005 (0.030) -0.005 (0.030) 
Macro-level variables 
Economic globalization -0.017 (0.015)  -0.016 (0.014) -0.016 (0.014) 
Political globalization -0.035*** (0.010)  -0.043*** (0.011) -0.035*** (0.010) 
Cultural globalization  0.044** (0.017) 0.045** (0.017) 0.037* (0.017) 
Attitude x Economic globalization  0.000 (0.000)     
Attitude x Political globalization   0.001** (0.001)   
Attitude x Cultural globalization     0.001* (0.001) 
Population  0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
GDP per Capita  0.009 (0.006) 0.009 (0.006) 0.008 (0.006) 
Gini Inequality  0.009 (0.021) 0.009 (0.021) 0.008 (0.020) 
Public social spending/GDP  0.052* (0.026) 0.052* (0.026) 0.051* (0.026) 
Quality of Democracy  0.031 (0.025) 0.030 (0.024) 0.029 (0.024) 
Corruption -0.011 (0.009)  -0.011 (0.009)  -0.011 (0.009) 
Effective number of parties  0.031 (0.079) 0.030 (0.078) 0.031 (0.078) 
Easter-Western Europe -0.472 (0.325)  -0.410 (0.325)  -0.400 (0.326) 
Attitude x Eastern-Western Europe  0.072*** (0.009)   0.081*** (0.008) 0.070*** (0.009) 
Time effect (ESS Round)  0.011 (0.063)   0.011 (0.063) 0.011 (0.063) 
(Intercept) -1.419 (1.705)  -0.791 (1.710) 0.054 (1.597) 
Variance components    
Country (SD) 0.276 0.275 0.277 
Country-years (SD) 0.431 0.430 0.429 
Individual (SD) 1.977 1.976 1.977 
N 89626 89626 89626 
AIC 377073 377065 377067 
Models are estimated by OLS-regressions; ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 (two-tailed tests). 
Note: coefficients are unstandardized. 
 
Table 2. Multilevel OLS model: Impact of attitudes towards globalization and globalization on political trust. 
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losers of globalization that can be described in terms of trust, these findings are in line with the idea 
that this gap increases as globalization increases. This indicates that the trust gap between winners 
and losers of globalization is to some extent indeed a consequence of globalization. However, note that 
this applies only to the political and cultural dimensions of globalization, and not to the economic 
dimension of globalization (since the interaction with economic globalization is not statistically sig-
nificant).  
Hypothesis 5 made predictions for the effect-sizes of the different dimensions of globaliza-
tion relative to each other. It expected that the interaction effect of cultural globalization and atti-
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Figure 4. Effect of attitude towards globalization on political trust in interaction with political globalization and region. Note: simu-
lated political trust based on model 3 in Table 2. Ticks on the Y-axis represent 0.5 increases. 
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Figure 4. Effect of attitude towards globalization on political trust in interaction with political globalization and region. Note: simu-
lated political trust based model 4 in Table 2. Ticks on the Y-axis represent 0.5 increases. 
 42 
 
tudes towards globalization is stronger than that of political and economic globalization. This expec-
tation is supported with regard to economic globalization, since cultural globalization does indeed 
have a stronger effect. However, when comparing political and cultural globalization, the interac-
tion-effects are similar. This indicates that not only cultural globalization reinforces the emergence 
of winners and losers of globalization, but the political dimension of globalization does so as well. 
Hence, Hypothesis 3 is only partially supported. 
Lastly, the effects of the control variables are fairly similar to model 1, and therefore do not 
need to be discussed again. The only difference that it noteworthy is that the time-effect does not 
have a statistically significant anymore. A very likely explanation for this finding is that the interac-
tion effects partly capture this difference in trust over time, meaning that the attitude towards global-
ization issues have become more negative over time. Such a negative trend in globalization attitudes 
might to a considerable extent be a consequence of the financial and economic crisis. Indeed, Serric-
chio et al. (2013) have found that the crisis has increased Euroscepticism and that the countries most 
affected by the crisis have experienced the most severe increase in Euroscepticism. If the economic 
crisis then has indeed had a negative effect on globalization attitudes, it might be asked why the in-
teraction with economic globalization is not statistically significant, but there is a plausible explana-
tion for this: Serricchio et al. also show that “the economic crisis did not substantially bring econom-
ic factors back in as an important source of Euroscepticism” (p. 51).  
 
5. Conclusion 
Is political trust affected by globalization? And if so, how? The goal of this thesis has been to pro-
vide an answer to these two questions. Being one of the first studies addressing this question empiri-
cally, it proposes two distinct mechanisms by which globalization might affect political trust. The 
first is based on the assumption that globalization has a constraining effect on a government’s set of 
feasible policy options, and holds that this makes a government less responsive to voter preferences, 
thereby leading to a decrease in political trust. The second assumes that globalization is more and 
more central to understanding the current divisions within European societies, and predicts that 
citizens’ attitudes towards globalization are positively related with political trust. In addition, it ex-
pects this relation to be more pronounced in countries that are more globalized. In other words, that 
there is a gap between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization in terms of trust, and that this gap 
increases as globalization increases.  
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The results of this study provide mixed support for the hypotheses derived from the first 
mechanism. The existence of a negative effect of economic globalization on political trust is not 
confirmed. This finding contradicts the expectation that it is mainly the economic dimension of 
globalization that has constrained national governments, and thereby led to a decrease in political 
trust. However, the findings do support the prediction derived from this mechanism that political 
globalization has a negative effect on political trust. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
political globalization either directly constrains policy-making on the national level by the restrictions 
imposed by treaties and agreements, or indirectly does so because of the ‘socialization effects’ more 
politically globalized countries experience (e.g. Goodman and Jinks, 2004; Simmons and Elkins, 
2004).  
 Critical to understanding these effects is whether economic and political globalization have 
indeed constrained governments in their policy-making. Yet the design of this study does not ac-
count for this constraining effect, and does thus not allow for a further exploration of the causal 
chain. This is a problem for related research as well (e.g. Fischer 2012; Steiner, 2010), and emphasiz-
es the importance of further research to understand more precisely which mechanisms are at work 
here. Nevertheless, the results do show that globalization has a relatively strong impact on political 
trust compared to country characteristics which are generally found to have an effect on trust, such 
as economic performance and corruption. This is a remarkable finding that has not been reported by 
earlier research. Despite the lack of evidence on the causal argument, these findings therefore do 
provide new insights for the literature on the effect of globalization on domestic politics.  
 The empirical results of this research do support the predictions of the second mechanism. 
Firstly, a consistently positive relation is found between globalization attitudes and political trust, 
meaning that trust is higher for people with a more positive attitude towards globalization. In addi-
tion, this effect is stronger in Western European countries. This finding is in accordance with the 
idea that the emerging gap between winners and losers of globalization is mainly a Western Europe-
an phenomenon. Most importantly, the results show that this gap in terms of trust increases as glob-
alization increases. This supports the theory that new social divisions are arising as a consequence of 
the effects of globalization. This finding thus contributes to our understanding of the newly emerg-
ing social divisions and the role of globalization herein. It indicates that governments of globalized 
countries would be well advised to pay more attention to the way they can counteract this new di-
vide.  
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Because hardly any previous literature is available that addresses the relation between global-
ization and political trust, the main purpose of this thesis was to identify possible mechanisms in-
stead of testing more precisely a particular part of an established theoretical framework. Looking at 
aggregate numbers and broad concepts, this study is open to the criticism that it links rather broad 
concepts without providing more specific evidence for the causal mechanisms at work. Indeed, it is 
evident that further work needs to be done to confirm the results and to refine these causal mecha-
nisms. As a suggestion, it would be interesting to focus on a smaller set of countries, thereby limiting 
the variation in other relevant variables (only the 17 countries that were coded as Western countries 
in this thesis for example). Such an analysis might also benefit from a more lengthy longitudinal 
comparison. The ESS was only started in 2002, but the European Value Survey (EVS) for example 
has been conducted since 1981.  
However, the results do reveal that the relation between globalization and political trust is a 
topic worthy of further investigation. The empirical evidence indicates that the different dimensions 
of globalization each in their own way have a considerable impact on political trust, thus adding to 
the emerging literature about the relation between national governments and their citizens in the 
light of globalization. In addition, the results show that the effect of globalization is not to be under-
estimated in understanding the emergence of new social divisions. Both findings contribute to 
scholarly understanding of globalization, but are certainly relevant outside the academic arena as 
well.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1. Variable description and coding 
 Range Mean 
Individual level variables 
Trust in parliament 0-10 4.33 
Attitude towards globalization* 0-10 5.3 
European unification 0-10 5.2 
Immigrants bad for culture 0-10 4.9 
Immigrant bad for economy 0-10 5.6 
Trust in people 0-10 4.97 
Interested in politics 1-4 2.37 
Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties 0-1 0.49 
How satisfied with present state of economy  0-10 4.34 
Left-right placement 0-10 5.09 
Age 12-123 47.46 
Gender (female is 1) 0-1 0.54 
Education 
Not possible to harmonize (residual) 0-1 0.26 
Lower than secondary 0-1 0.08 
Lower secondary 0-1 0.14 
Lower tier upper secondary 0-1 0.15 
Advanced vocational 0-1 0.07 
Lower tertiary, BA-level 0-1 0.07 
Higher tertiary, MA-level 0-1 0.07 
Occupation 
Armed Forces 0-1 0.01 
Managers 0-1 0.09 
Professionals 0-1 0.13 
Technicians, associate professionals 0-1 0.15 
Service and sales workers 0-1 0.15 
Agriculture and fishery workers 0-1 0.04 
Craft workers 0-1 0.13 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0-1 0.08 
Elementary workers 0-1 0.12 
Country-level variables 
KOF Index of Globalization 61-92 83.1 
Economic globalization 52-99 80.3 
Political globalization 50-98 89.4 
Cultural globalization 57-97 81.6 
Population (x1.000) 290-82.531 22.305 
GDP per Capita (x 1.000) 0.6-100 31.3 
Gini Inequality** 22-38 29 
Public social spending/GDP (%) 13-33 22.8% 
Quality of Democracy** 45-75 58.6 
Corruption*** 22-97 67.7 
Effective number of parties 2-9.1 4 
Eastern-Western Europe (Western is 1) 0-1 0.59 
Note: N = 89.626, or 161.188 with exclusion of the Attitude towards globalization variable. 
Details on coding: * Variable is constructed equally weighting the three indicators ** Missing values linearly inter-
polated *** A higher score indicates less corruption 
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Appendix Table 2. Collinearity statistics for country-level variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  VIF VIF 
Globalization  2.388   
Economic Globalization   3.721 
2.189 
3.432 
3.794 
3.228 
1.459 
1.986 
7.763 
7.911 
2.039 
3.304 
Political Globalization   
Cultural Globalization   
Population  1.905 
2.828 
1.412 
1.687 
6.647 
6.223 
1.895 
3.178 
GDP per Capita  
Gini Inequality  
Public social spending/GDP  
Quality of Democracy  
Corruption  
Eff. no. of parties  
Eastern-Western Europe  
             Note: dependent variable is trust in parliament 
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Appendix Table 3. Countries included per ESS-round 
  Round 1 
(2002) 
Round 2 
(2004) 
Round 3 
(2006) 
Round 4 
(2008) 
Round 5 
(2010) 
Round 6 
(2012) 
Austria • • • • •  
Belgium • • • • • • 
Bulgaria   • • • • 
Croatia    • •  
Cyprus   • • • • 
Czech  • •  • • • 
Denmark • • • • • • 
Estonia   • • • • • 
Finland • • • • • • 
France  • • • • • • 
Germany • • • • • • 
Greece  • •  • •  
Hungary  • • • • • • 
Iceland   •    • 
Ireland • • • • • • 
Italy • •    • 
Lithuania     • • • 
Luxembourg  • •     
Netherlands  • • • • • • 
Norway • • • • • • 
Poland • • • • • • 
Portugal  • • • • • • 
Slovakia   • • • • • 
Slovenia  • • • • • • 
Spain  • • • • • • 
Sweden  • • • • • • 
Switzerland • • • • • • 
Ukraine   • • • • • 
UK  • • • • • • 
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